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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK P. O'DONNELL, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
MARY A. O'DONNELL, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 930300-CA 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-2A-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in considering plaintiffs present wife's 
income in determining that no substantial change of circumstances had taken place for 
purposes of modification of alimony and child support. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's conclusions of law arising from its factual 
findings are examined under a correction of error standard, according no particular deference 
to the trial court. Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in applying Rasband v. Rasband. 752 
P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988) to determine that no substantial change of circumstances had 
taken place for purposes of modification of alimony and child support. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's conclusions of law arising from its factual 
findings are examined under a correction of error standard, according no particular deference 
to the trial court. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472. 
3. Issue: Whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings that plaintiffs 
income was difficult to establish, and that plaintiff had failed to establish what his income 
was. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's findings will not be disturbed unless they 
are clearly erroneous, that is, against the clear weight of the evidence, or unless the appellate 
court reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Dunn v. Dunn, 
802 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah App. 1990); UTAH R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact . . . shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . ..") 
4. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in awarding defendant $4,000 in 
attorney's fees when there was no evidence that she had paid or ever would be required to pay 
attorney's fees, since she was an employee of her attorney's law firm. 
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court abused its discretion. Rasband, 
752 P. 2d at 1336. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the district court's order denying plaintiff/appellant Frank 
O'Donnell's (''plaintiff') petition to modify a divorce decree and to reduce alimony and child 
support, and from the court's order awarding defendant/appellee Mary O'Donnell 
("defendant'') $4,000 in attorney's fees incurred in defending against the petition. 
The decree of divorce was originally entered in this case in August of 1990. The 
financial issues were reserved. At the trial on February 28, 1991, the financial issues were 
resolved based on proffers, court rulings, and stipulations, and on May 9, 1991, the court 
entered a supplemental decree of divorce, awarding defendant alimony of $500 per month, 
child support of $500 per month, and ordering plaintiff to pay the parties' child's private 
school tuition and registration fees. 
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On October 3, 1991, plaintiff filed a petition to modify the decree of divorce seeking 
to terminate his alimony obligation, reduce the child support payments, and eliminate his 
obligation to pay private school tuition and related expenses. 
Following a trial on the motion on November 30, 1992, the court denied the petition 
to modify the divorce decree. On April 1, 1993, the court entered the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. On May 11, 1993, the court made a further minute entry awarding the 
defendant $4,000 in attorney's fees, and on June 11, 1993, the court entered an order 
regarding attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were married on February 15, 1965, in Edinburgh, Scotland. 
(Record on Appeal (hereinafter 4*R.") at p. 147). They have two children, Stephen, who was 
already 18 years old when the divorce was filed in June 1988, and Amanda, who was 13 
years old in 1988. (R. at 2). Amanda turned 18 in 1993 and graduated from high school in 
June 1993. (R. at 40). 
Plaintiff was employed as a mining engineer during the marriage. In the years 1980 
through 1985, his salary ranged from approximately $39,000 to $81,000. (R. at 637). In 
1986, he founded his own company, Scotia Systems, Inc. O'Scotia"). He earned only $17,000 
the first year, but the following three years the company did very well, and plaintiff earned 
$133,000. $115,00, and $161,000, in 1987, 1988, and 1989, respectively. (R. at 637). 
Plaintiff filed for divorce in June 1988. (R. at 2). In April 1989, the commissioner 
recommended that defendant be awarded temporary custody of Amanda, that plaintiff be 
ordered to pay $3,500 a month as temporary alimony and child support, of which $1,144 was 
deemed child support. (R. at 53). The court adopted the commissioner's recommendation. 
(R. at 59-60). 
In late 1989, Scotia experienced a reversal of fortune due to a dispute with another 
company which resulted in large losses to Scotia. (Transcript (hereinafter "Tr."') at 34). In 
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1990, plaintiff earned only $48,000. (R. at. 352). Plaintiff fell behind in his alimony and 
child support payments, and defendant brought a motion for judgment for the amounts owed. 
On August 9, 1990, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the court granted plaintiff a 
divorce, but reserved all other issues for trial. (R. at 143, 149-150). On September 12, 1990, 
the court entered judgment against plaintiff for unpaid alimony in the amount of $2,460. (R. 
at 163). On September 20, 1990, plaintiff filed a motion to reduce temporary alimony and 
child support. (R. at 167-172). 
On February, 28, 1991, the trial was scheduled on the remaining issues in the divorce. 
(R. at 233). The parties made proffers and reached an agreement, which was read into the 
record. Id. Based on plaintiffs income of $48,000 in 1990, and his belief, at the time, that he 
would continue to receive at least $48,000 a year in income, plaintiff agreed to pay alimony 
in the sum of $500 a month and child support for Amanda in the sum of $500 a month. The 
findings of fact recited that the awards of alimony were based on plaintiffs income at that 
time of $4,000 per month. (Finding of Fact No. 5, R. at 352). Plaintiff also agreed to pay 
Amanda's tuition at a private school. Id. The court rendered judgment against plaintiff for 
$6,000 for unpaid alimony. (R. at 360). 
Scotia continued to suffer severe financial difficulties during 1991 and was unable to 
make regular salary payments. (R. at 34, 38). Plaintiff fell further behind in his alimony 
payments; in September 1991, defendant obtained another judgment for unpaid alimony and 
medical expenses in the amount of $2,003.08. (R. at 318). In October 1991, plaintiff filed a 
petition to modify the divorce decree to eliminate his obligation to pay alimony, reduce his 
child support obligation, and terminate his obligation to pay private school tuition. (R. at 
327). Plaintiff attached an affidavit from his six co-workers stating that the financial 
situation of the company was so bad that they too had foregone paychecks and had had to 
take out personal loans to meet their living expenses. (R. at 339-340). 
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On November 23, 1991, plaintiff remarried. (Tr. at 58). His present wife, Susan 
O'Donneil (formerly Susan Dykstra), is employed by Scotia as a bookkeeper. (Tr. at 107). In 
1991, plaintiff earned $23,900 and his wife, Susan, earned $11,850. (Exhibit 2-P). 
In February 1992, plaintiff obtained a judgment in the amount of $3,000 for unpaid 
alimony and child support. (R. at 433). On June 10, 1992, having obtained new counsel, 
plaintiff filed an amended petition to modify. (R. at 533). 
During the first three quarters of 1992, plaintiff received $30,000 in gross salary from 
Scotia. (Exhibit 1-P). At the trial, which took place on November 30, 1992, plaintiff 
testified that he did not expect to receive any more money from the company during 1992. 
(Tr. at 35). Plaintiff testified that he actually received $21,750.38 in 1992, after deductions 
for taxes. Medicare, FICA, an employee cafeteria plan, and a retirement plan. (Tr. at 35; 
Exhibit 1-P). In addition to the benefits deducted from his paycheck, the company provides 
plaintiff with a company car, for both business and personal use, and pays for most expenses 
associated with operating the car. Plaintiff also testified that the company reimbursed him 
for expenses incurred for travel and entertainment on behalf of the company. (Tr. at 38, 58, 
109). 
Plaintiffs wife Susan testified that she had received $11,350 from Scotia in 1991, as 
reflected in her 1991 tax return, and that she had received $17,700 from Scotia thus far in 
1992. (R. at 107). Susan's base salary was $36,000 a year. (R. at 107). 
Defendant is employed as a paralegal in the domestic division of the law firm of 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal. (Tr. at 125). Her attorney, David S. Dolowitz, is a member of 
the firm. Defendant has not actually paid any attorney's fees to her employer. (Tr. at 123-
124). The firm does not bill her. (Tr. at 124). 
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court took the case under advisement. (Tr. at 
127). On December 4, 1992, the court issued a minute entry denying the petition for 
modification. (R. at 589-591). Plaintiff filed an objection to the proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and order on March 29, 1993. (R. at 636-642). On April 1, 1993, the 
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court entered the order, findings of fact, and conclusions of law drafted by defendant's 
attorney. On May 11, 1993, the court made a further minute entry awarding defendant 
$4,000 in attorney's fees in connection with the petition to modify; the order regarding 
attorney's fees was entered on June 11, 1993. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I The trial court erred in applying Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986), to 
the facts of this case by considering plaintiffs present wife's income for purposes of 
determining that no substantial change of circumstances had taken place which would justify 
a modification of plaintiffs alimony and child support obligations. First, the Paffel decision 
rests on an earlier case, Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980), which has since been 
overturned by the legislature's adoption of a statute prohibiting the trial court from using the 
income of the obligor's new spouse in determining an award of child support under the child 
support guidelines. Second, Paffel is inapplicable because the facts are different: In Paffel, 
the ex-husband tried to offset his income by including his new wife's expenses with his own. 
Here, the plaintiff excluded his present spouse's expenses as well as her income from his own 
expenses and income. 
II. The trial court erred in applying Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, to conclude that 
travel and entertainment expenses must be considered in determining the plaintiffs income. 
In Rasband, the court was merely commenting on the disparity in the incomes of the parties 
created by the trial court's meager award of alimony to a wife who had zero income after a 
30-year marriage-the court noted that the disparity was augmented by the husband's ability 
to expense some personal items through his business. The case was remanded for findings 
on the wife's ability to produce sufficient income for herself—the case does not hold that 
business travel and entertainment expenses must be considered or even should be considered 
in determining the husband's income for purposes of modifying an alimony award. 
III. The trial court's findings that plaintiffs income was difficult to establish and 
that plaintiff had failed to establish his income are clearly erroneous. It is not difficult to tell 
what plaintiffs income is just because he is employed by a closely held corporation in which 
he is also a principal. Plaintiff presented uncontroverted evidence of his salary for the two 
years preceding the hearing, which showed that plaintiffs gross salary had decreased by 
$1,500 a month since the time the divorce decree was entered, due to a reversal of fortune 
suffered by his company. Plaintiff drives a company car and has an expense account he uses 
to entertain clients and travel on company business. Although plaintiff did not show the 
exact value of these benefits, the evidence was uncontroverted that these benefits were about 
the same as they had been when the divorce decree was entered. Therefore, the court's 
finding that plaintiff had failed to establish a change in circumstances is clearly against the 
weight of the evidence. 
IV. The trial court erred in awarding defendant $4,000 in attorney's fees when the 
court failed to make the requisite findings of financial need of the receiving party and ability 
of the other party to pay. The trial court merely found that plaintiff earned more money than 
defendant. Such a finding is not sufficient to base an award of attorney's fees in a divorce 
modification proceeding. Moreover, defendant is employed by her attorney, and there was 
no evidence in the record that she had ever paid, or ever would be required to pay, attorney's 
fees in this matter. Therefore, defendant did not demonstrate a financial need for attorney's 
fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING PLAINTIFF'S 
PRESENT WIFE'S INCOME IN DETERMINING THAT NO 
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES HAD 
TAKEN PLACE FOR PURPOSES OF MODIFICATION OF 
ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT 
In determining that there had been no change in circumstances, justifying a change in 
plaintiffs alimony and child support obligations, the trial court considered not only plaintiffs 
income, but also the income of plaintiffs present wife, expressly relying on Pqffel, 732 P.2d 
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96. (Minute Entry and Conclusions of Law 11 1). The trial court erred in applying Paffel to 
this case for two reasons. 
First, the Utah Supreme Court based its decision in Paffel on an earlier decision 
which has since been overturned by the legislature. In Paffel, the Utah Supreme Court 
rejected the appellant's complaint that the trial court had abused its discretion by considering 
his present wife's income and separate assets in determining his ability to pay alimony. The 
court cited its earlier decision in KieseL 619 P.2d 1374, holding that it was not improper to 
consider the income earned by the plaintiffs present wife in determining the ability of the 
plaintiff to pay child support. In PaffeU the court reasoned that because the supporting 
spouse's ability to pay is a factor in determining both child support and spousal support, the 
situations are analogous, and the analysis should be similar. Therefore, the court found that 
the principle stated in Kiesel applied in Paffel. 
However, in 1989, the Utah legislature expressly eliminated consideration of a new 
spouse's income for purposes of calculating each parent's share of the child support award. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.4 (Supp. 1992) provides: "Only income of the natural or 
adoptive parents of the child may be used to determine the award under [the child support] 
guidelines/' Since the ability of the supporting spouse to pay child support and his ability to 
pay alimony are subject to the same principles, as the Utah Supreme Court announced in 
Paffel, the trial court is now precluded from considering the present wife's income for 
purposes of determining ability to pay child support and alimony. 
Second, the facts of this case distinguish it from Paffel. In Paffel, the appellant 
included the joint expenses of himself and his present wife in his testimony at the trial 
concerning his expenses and his ability to pay support. Obviously, it would not have been 
fair to let appellant offset his income with his new wife's expenses without also including her 
income. Here, the plaintiff specifically excluded his present wife's expenses from the 
evidence he presented at trial. (Exhibit P-3). 
Thus, the court erred in applying Paffel to the facts of the present case and in 
considering plaintiffs present wife's income in concluding that there was no substantial 
change of circumstances. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING RASBAND V. 
RASBAND TO DETERMINE THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL 
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES HAD TAKEN PLACE. 
Citing Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, the trial court concluded that in determining the 
income of the plaintiff, the court "must consider the value of the perks and expenses that are 
paid for him, including travel and entertainment/' (R. at 639,1f 2). 
Rasband is wholly inapplicable to the facts of this case. Rasband involved an appeal 
from an original decree of divorce, not a modification of the decree based on changed 
circumstances. In Rasband, the court awarded the wife automatically decreasing alimony 
which ended after five years, and the wife appealed. The trial court had based its award of 
decreasing alimony on its finding that the wife was capable of meaningful employment in the 
future, even though she had not worked during the course of a thirty year marriage, and had 
little education, training, or experience. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial 
court for further findings of fact concerning the wife's ability to earn. In dicta, the court 
remarked on the striking disparity in the incomes of the parties--the wife had zero income 
while the husband earned about $45,000 as an independent insurance agent-obviously, his 
standard of living would be much nearer that enjoyed during the marriage than hers. 
Rasband. 752 P.2d at 1333. Judge Jackson, writing for a three judge panel, commented, 
"[t]his disparity is augmented by his ability to expense some personal items through his 
business and by her additional expense in caring for their [disabled] adult daughter." 
Rasband. 752 P.2d at 1333. Later in the opinion, in commenting on the disparity in 
discretionary incomes created by the trial court's award. Judge Jackson noted, "[tjhis leaves 
him with SI0.000 annual discretionary income, in addition to the advantage he enjoys by 
being able to expense some personal living expenses through the business/' Id. at 1335. 
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In Rasband, Judge Jackson's remarks about the husband's being able to expense some 
personal items through his business were dicta-the court was merely commenting on the 
disparity in the parties' income created by the trial court's meager award of alimony. The trial 
court's unsupported finding that Mrs. Rasband had the ability to earn sufficient money in the 
future was the issue in the case—not the determination of Mr. Rasband's income, and whether 
personal expenses paid through a business must be included in determining income. 
Thus, the trial court erred in applying Rasband to conclude that travel and 
entertainment expenses must be considered in determining the income of plaintiff in this 
case. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT PLAINTIFF'S 
INCOME WAS DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH AND THAT 
PLAINTIFF HAD FAILED TO ESTABLISH HIS INCOME ARE 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
A trial court has discretion to modify a divorce decree to reduce or eliminate alimony 
if it determines that there has been a substantial change of material circumstances subsequent 
to the decree, not contemplated at the time of the decree. Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
A party seeking modification of a divorce decree has the burden of showing a 
substantial change in circumstances. Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah 
App. 1990). The purpose of an alimony award is to enable the receiving spouse to maintain, 
as nearly as possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, and to prevent the 
receiving spouse from becoming a public charge. Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 76 (Utah 
App. 1991). In determining alimony, a trial court must consider three factors: (1) the 
financial condition and needs of the receiving spouse, (2) the ability of the receiving spouse 
to provide sufficient income for him or herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to 
provide support. Id. 
The trial court concluded that plaintiff had not established what his present income 
was, and thus had not established a material change in circumstance requiring modification of 
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the decree of divorce. (R. at 638, Conclusions of Law f^ 4). In reaching the conclusion that 
plaintiff had not established what his income was, the court found: "It is difficult from the 
records brought into court and the testimony of the Plaintiff and his wife, to determine 
precisely what is the Plaintiffs present income." (R. at 638. Findings of Fact f 7). 
The court's finding that plaintiffs income is difficult to establish, and its conclusion 
that plaintiff failed to clearly establish his income, are clearly erroneous. To demonstrate that 
a trial court's finding of fact is clearly erroneous, the appellant must first marshal all the 
evidence that supports the finding and then demonstrate that, despite this evidence, the 
finding is so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Crockett v. 
Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (1992). 
A. The Evidence In Support Of The Court's Finding. 
At the trial, plaintiff testified that he is employed by Scotia, a company which designs 
gold recovery plants. (Tr. at 33). Plaintiff is the vice-president, a director, and shareholder of 
Scotia. (Tr. at 33). Plaintiff owns 15% of the stock of Scotia, and he is one of seven 
shareholders and five employees. (Tr. at 33, 34). Plaintiffs present wife is also employed by 
Scotia as a bookkeeper. (Tr. at 107). 
Plaintiff drives a car provided by the company. (Tr. at 39). The company pays for 
gas, insurance, and repairs. Id. Plaintiff does not know how much the insurance premiums 
are. (Tr. at 71). The company pays plaintiff s medical insurance. (Tr. at 39). 
Plaintiff has an expense account which he uses to entertain clients and business 
prospects and travel on company business. (Tr. at 39, 58, 109). Sometimes plaintiffs wife 
accompanies him at lunches when he entertains clients. (Tr. at 58). Plaintiff does not keep 
track of his own meals and those of his wife, separate from those of his clients. (Tr. at 79; 
Exhibit 7-D). 
B. The Evidence In Contravention Of The Court's Finding. 
The evidence in support of the court's finding is so scanty that the trial court, in effect, 
laid down a per se rule that because plaintiff is employed by a closely held corporation in 
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which he is a principal, it is impossible to tell what he actually receives from the company. 
However, plaintiffs evidence of his income was uncontroverted and clearly demonstrated a 
substantial decrease from his income at the time of the hearing on the supplemental decree of 
divorce on February 28, 1991. 
Plaintiff presented evidence of his salary for the previous two years at the hearing on 
November 30, 1992. Exhibit 1-P is a company ledger sheet which shows plaintiffs earnings 
for 1992 through November 23, 1992, and the amounts withheld from each check. Plaintiff 
testified that he did not expect to receive any more salary payments for 1992 because there 
was no money coming in to the company. (Tr. at 35). According to the exhibit and plaintiffs 
testimony, his gross salary was $30,000 for 1992, of which he received $21,750.38 after 
deductions for taxes, Medicare, FICA, an employee cafeteria plan, and retirement (ATR 
insurance). Exhibit 2-P is a copy of plaintiffs 1991 individual income tax return and W-2 
forms, which shows that plaintiffs income was $23,900 in 1991—less than half the $48,000 
salary he was supposed to receive in 1991. 
The 1992 ledger sheet (Exhibit 1 -P) shows the exact amount of benefits paid by the 
company for plaintiff in the form of deductions for a cafeteria plan and for ATR insurance, 
which is a voluntary retirement program. (R. at 108). 
Nor are the other benefits plaintiff receives from the company-mainly a company car 
and some meals-substantially difficult to quantify. Defendant's Exhibit 8-D, which itemizes 
plaintiffs business expenses for the last quarter of 1991, shows plaintiff eating lunch with 
clients an average of seven times a month—eating lunch once or twice a week at company 
expense can hardly be termed a significant benefit or one that is very difficult to evaluate. 
Likewise, the use of a company car is not a benefit that is difficult to value, or even relevant 
for purposes of determining plaintiffs disposable income, since the expense of owning and 
operating his own automobile normally would be included in plaintiffs statement of 
expenses. Here, plaintiff included only minimal monthly automobile expenses—$20, which 
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he testified he spent for washing and parking the car—attributable to his use of an automobile 
in his statement of monthly expenses introduced at the trial. (Exhibit 3-P). 
In addition, the fact that plaintiff drives a company car and eats a few meals a week at 
company expense is not really relevant to the issue of whether his income has changed, since 
these are benefits plaintiff has always enjoyed. (Tr. at 116). Plaintiff testified that the car 
was purchased in 1988, when the company was more prosperous, and that the company had 
tried to get rid of the car, but its bluebook value was less than the amount owing on it. (Tr. at 
105). In plaintiffs financial declaration, filed October 4, 1989, plaintiff did not claim any 
auto expense or auto payments as monthly expenses. (R. at 72). 
Finally, the court's finding that plaintiff receives a travel and entertainment allowance 
from the company is unsupported by any evidence in the record. Plaintiff testified that the 
company reimbursed him for his travel and entertainment expenses incurred on behalf of the 
company, but that he did not receive any reimbursement for personal travel or entertainment. 
(Tr. at 39). 
In Muir, 841 P.2d 736, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order modifying 
a divorce decree to reduce the husband's obligation to pay alimony, and remanded the case to 
the trial court for more detailed findings concerning the husband's income from his business. 
The court rejected as inadequate the trial court's finding that the husband's income had 
decreased. 
The facts in this case are distinguishable from those in Muir. In Muir, the husband, 
who owned 96.61% of the stock and had total discretion over the amount he received as 
compensation each year, claimed that even though gross revenues of his business were the 
same, expenses had increased, depreciation had decreased, and the business needed capital 
reinvestment. Here, plaintiff owns only 15% of the stock in the company, which hardly gives 
him total control over the company. In addition, plaintiff testified that the company's 
revenues had decreased drastically, forcing all the employees to take pay cuts. There is no 
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evidence here, as there was in Muir, that the company is making a profit or that any amounts 
are being reinvested in the company. 
Plaintiffs evidence shows exactly what he received from the company during the 
relevant time periods. The evidence is undisputed that plaintiff received gross wages of 
$23,900 in 1991, and $30,000 in 1992, while his benefits remained about the same. The 
parties stipulated that his expenses were about the same. (Tr. at 111). The difference 
between plaintiffs 1992 income and the income upon which alimony and child support were 
based of $48,000, is $18,000, or $1,500 a month, which represents a substantial and material 
change in circumstances. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DEFENDANT 
S4,000 IN ATTORNEY'S FEES WHEN THERE WAS NO 
EVIDENCE THAT SHE HAD PAID OR EVER WOULD BE 
REQUIRED TO PAY ATTORNEY'S FEES 
A trial court has the discretion to award costs and attorney's fees in divorce and 
modification proceedings. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818. However, the decision to award 
attorney's fees must be based upon the financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of 
the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the fees. Id. 
Here, the trial court ordered plaintiff to pay defendant $4,000 for her attorney's fees. 
(R. at 697-698). The court found that defendant had incurred attorney's fees of $5,616.75. 
The court also found that: 
[B]oth Plaintiff and his present wife are employed, and that Plaintiff has actual 
earnings and the obligation of support to him owed by his present wife while the 
Defendant has lesser earnings and no additional support coming to her, . . . the 
Plaintiff has the ability to assist Defendant in payment of her attorney's fees . . . . 
R. at 697-698. 
Plaintiff appeals from the court's award of attorney's fees to defendant for three 
reasons. First, plaintiff objects to the trial court's finding, as reflected in the order drafted by 
defendant's attorney, that the attorney's fees were reasonable-such a finding does not reflect 
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the court's findings as reflected in its minute entry of May 11, 1993, or in its announcement 
in open court during the hearing on the issue of attorney's fees on May 11, 1993. (R. at 674). 
Second, a finding that defendant has lesser earnings than plaintiff is not tantamount to 
a finding that defendant has a financial need for attorney's fees-the court must find that 
defendant is in financial need of having her attorney's fees paid, not merely that plaintiff 
makes more money than defendant. Likewise, the fact that plaintiff makes more money than 
defendant is not proof that he has the ability to pay the defendant's attorney's fees. Since the 
trial court failed to make the requisite findings to support its award of attorney's fees, the trial 
court erred, as a matter of law, in ordering plaintiff to pay defendant's attorney's fees. 
Third, there is no evidence in the record that defendant has actually paid or will be 
required to pay attorney's fees in this matter, as defendant is employed by her attorney. 
Defendant testified that she had not paid any attorney's fees in this matter, and that she had 
not received any bills for attorney's fees. (Tr. at 123-124). There is simply no evidence in 
the record that defendant has a financial need for attorney's fees. Thus, the court erred in 
ordering plaintiff to pay defendant's attorneys fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a substantial change in his 
income because plaintiff failed to establish precisely what his and his present wife's income 
is. This conclusion is clearly erroneous; first, it is improper for the court to consider 
plaintiffs present wife's income, and second, plaintiff presented wage statements and ledger 
sheets showing exactly what he received in wages from the company in 1991 and 1992, and 
this evidence was undisputed. It is also undisputed that plaintiff drives a company car and 
that he is reimbursed for meals he eats while entertaining clients. The fact that plaintiff did 
not show the precise value of these benefits is irrelevant to the question of whether his 
income has changed, because these are benefits plaintiff had when the original divorce decree 
was entered. 
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Plaintiffs evidence that his income had decreased by $1,500 per month is 
uncontroverted. Such a decrease represents a substantial and material change in 
circumstances and warrants a modification of the decree of divorce. Plaintiff requests the 
Court of Appeals reverse the decision of the trial court denying plaintiffs petition to modify 
the decree of divorce. 
DATED this 6th day of August, 1993. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
A Professional Corporation 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
By_ dflL 
ELLEN MApebCK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT to the following, postage prepaid, this 6th day of August. 1993: 
David S. Dolowitz. Esq. 
Cohne. Rappaport & Segal 
525 East 100 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
ADDENDUM INDEX 
1. Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law per Minute Entry Dated 
September 25, 1991, entered October 10, 1991. 
2. Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce and Judgment per Minute Entry of 
September 25, 1991, entered October 10, 1991. 
3. Minute Entry dated December 4. 1991. 
4. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered April 1, 1993. 
5. Order entered April 1, 1993. 
6. Minute Entry dated May 11,1993. 
7. Order and Judgment entered June 14, 1993. 
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (Bar No. 0899) U v 
Attorney for Defendant 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
™T 1 o O 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor , ,. 
P. 0. Box 11008 J 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
FRANK P. 0' DONNELL, 
Plaintiff, 
)^jC\AcXij^.Qy$ 
vs. 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PER MINUTE 
ENTRY DATED SEPTEMBER 25, 1991 
Civil No. 884902181DA 
MARY A. 0' DONNELL, ) Judge Richard H. Moffat 
Defendant, 
oooOooo 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial, the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding on Thursday, the 28th day of 
February, 1991. The plaintiff was present in person and 
represented by counsel, James P. Cowley and Matthew F. McNulty. 
Defendant was present in person and represented by counsel David S. 
Dolowitz. The parties entered into discussion with the court, made 
proffers of evidence which the parties thereafter were placed under 
oath and swore that they were true and correct and presented 
certain issues to the court which were thereafter argued. The 
court then took certain questions under advisement and being 
advised in the premises, issued its decision in regard to those 
issues and determined to accept the stipulations of the parties. 
The court entered a subsequent order on June 21, 1991, amending the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Based thereon, the court 
has determined and hereby makes and enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. A Decree of Divorce has been previously entered in this 
matter on the 9th day of August, 1990. 
2. The parties have had as issue of this marriage two 
children one of whom, Amanda, is a minor who will be sixteen (16) 
in February of 1991. 
3. The parties stipulated that care, custody and control of 
the Amanda should be awarded to the defendant subject to reasonable 
rights of visitation in the plaintiff. 
4. The plaintiff agreed that he should be required to 
provide such health insurance protection for Amanda as is available 
through his employment and each of the parties agree that they 
should be required to pay one-half (1/2) of any uninsured medical 
or dental expenses incurred on behalf of Amanda. 
5. The plaintiff was employed throughout the marriage and 
has had the following history of earnings: 
Year Company Amount 
1980 Kilborn, Ltd. $ 39,203 
1981 Kilborn, Ltd. $ 43,508 
1982 Kilborn, Ltd. $ 57,800 
1983 Kilborn, Ltd. $ 49,200 
1984 Kilborn, Ltd. $ 57,694 
1985 Custom equipment $ 80,912 
1986 Scotia Systems, Inc. $ 17, 193 
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1987 Scotia Systems, Inc. $133,391 
1988 Scotia, Inc. $115,653 
1989 Scotia, Inc. $161,000 
In 1990, plaintiff had W-2 income of $48,000.00 and presently 
has income of $4,000. 00 per month. The defendant is presently 
employed as a legal assistant and earns a gross income of $1,500.00 
per month. 
6. The parties agreed that they had earned a higher income 
and enjoyed a standard of living more affluent than that which they 
presently enjoy, however, there is only enough income to provide 
support at a lower level, to wit: alimony in the sum of $500.00 
per month, which alimony would terminate upon the remarriage or 
death of the defendant or further order of the court and child 
support in the sum of $500.00 per month until Amanda graduates from 
high school with her regularly-scheduled graduating class and in 
addition thereto, the plaintiff will pay monthly tuition and 
registration fees to Judge Memorial High School until such time as 
Amanda shall graduate from that school. Defendant should provide 
books, uniforms and additional school expenses. 
7. Because the present levels of income are below the 
historical income of the parties during the course of their 
marriage, the parties should each be ordered to exchange 
information regarding their income on April 15 of each year 
commencing 1991, including the exchange of income tax returns and 
six (6) months thereafter, to wit: October 15, 1991, and every 
April and October thereafter, exchange present income earnings 
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including year to date income payment stubs. In considering the 
income exchanged, they should also disclose perks, which are 
provided for their benefit such as use of a car, use of a company 
credit card, use of an expense account or such other similar items. 
8. The parties agree that the home they acquired on Skyline 
Drive, Lot 2 6, Quailbrook Subdivision, and the 1985 Blazer should 
be awarded to the defendant and the plaintiff should be ordered to 
execute all necessary documents to transmit all right, title and 
interest of those properties to the defendant who thereafter should 
be required to assume and pay any debts or obligations due and 
owing thereon and hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
9. The parties acquired an interest in a corporation known 
as Scotia Systems, Inc. , and a corporation known as Scotia 
Engineering. All of the stock acquired by them in Scotia Systems, 
Inc. , 340 shares, and the stock acquired in Scotia Engineering, 150 
shares, the parties agreed, should be awarded to the defendant and 
the plaintiff should be ordered to sign all necessary documents to 
transfer the stock ownership of those securities to the defendant. 
In making these transfers, the parties recognize that the plaintiff 
is a founder of each of these corporations and has done business 
through them along with a third corporation, Scotia, Inc. , which 
has been dissolved. These are the means by which he has carried 
out his employment and occupation. He has been the president and 
chief executive officer of these corporations. 
10. Each of the parties should be awarded their own personal 
property and personal effects presently in their possession. 
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11. The court, pursuant to the recommendation of the 
commissioner in this matter, ordered the plaintiff to pay to the 
defendant alimony in the sum of $2,356. 00 per month. The plaintiff 
made those payments regularly until September of 1990. In 
September of 19 90, he petitioned the court to reduce the payment of 
$1,000.00 per month and did not make any payments of alimony 
thereafter. The defendant has requested the court to reduce the 
unpaid alimony to judgment either in the sum of $14, 136.00, the 
unpaid original ordered amount for six (6) months or $6,000.00 
granting the reduction requested by the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
has requested that no alimony arrearages be ordered. The court 
determined that the plaintiff is indebted to the defendant for 
$6,000.00 unpaid alimony and defendant is entitled to a judgment in 
her favor for this sum. 
12. In 1989, the plaintiff purchased an annuity for his 
retirement from Mass Mutual Insurance Company. The money 
accumulated in that policy has been utilized to try to keep it in 
effect and funds are presently due to keep it in full force and 
effect. It is in technical default. The plaintiff is attempting to 
maintain that and keep that as an asset. He should be required to 
keep the defendant advised as to his success in reinstating that as 
an asset. 
13. The plaintiff filed a separate income tax return for the 
year 1989. He has agreed that he should file a joint tax return 
with the defendant for that year. An amended return should be 
prepared and filed, but the plaintiff should not be required to pay 
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any additional tax or penalties due to the Internal Revenue Service 
or the State of Utah. 
14. Each of the parties incurred attorney' s fees in the 
approximate sum of $10,000.00 which they agreed were reasonable and 
necessary since they so closely matched. 
DATED this /V day of Qj^S^tA^ , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: , 
(W 
HONORABLE RICfiXRD H. MOFFAT 
T h i r d J u d i c i / * / D i s t r i c t C o u r t J u d g e 
APPROVED AS REFLECTING 
THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES 
AND THE RULING OF THE COURT: 
MATTHEW F. McNULTY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
_____ - •' ^ ~ y & ~ ^ ~* 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ J 
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendan t ^ 
(cdm\dsd\marysupp. fof) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a member of and/or employed with 
the law firm of COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. , 525 East First 
South, Suite 500, P.O.Box 11008, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008, 
and that in said capacity, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law per 
Minute Entry Dated September 25, 1991, to be mailed to the 
person(s) named below: 
Frank 0' Donnell 
6935 South 825 East 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
on this day of October, 1991. 
cdm\dsd\o'donnel.cos 
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (Bar No. 0899) 
Attorney for Defendant i. .- •- .-- • 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. _ jL> / u i ^ W c f l ^ -. 
52 5 E a s t F i r s t S o u t h , F i f t h F l o o r '"'"' f ^ ^ r —?f_ 
P. 0. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
FRANK P. O' DONNELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARY A. O' DONNELL, 
Defendant 
AMENDED 
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE 
AND JUDGMENT PER MINUTE ENTRY OF 
SEPTEMBER 25, 1991 
Civil No. 884902181DA 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
£ I6SSD 
oooOooo 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial, the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding on Thursday, the 28th day of 
February, 1991. The plaintiff was present in person and 
represented by counsel, James P. Cowley and Matthew F. McNulty. 
Defendant was present in person and represented by counsel David S. 
Dolowitz. The parties entered into discussion with the court, made 
proffers of evidence which the parties thereafter were placed under 
oath and swore that they were true and correct and presented 
certain issues to the court which were thereafter argued. The 
court then took certain questions under advisement and being 
advised in the premises, issued its decision in regard to those 
issues and determined to accept the stipulations of the parties. 
The court entered a subsequent order on June 21, 1991, amending the 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce and Judgments and having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. This court has jurisdiction over the parties, the subject 
matter of this action and the minor child of the parties. 
2. Care, custody and control of Amanda shall be awarded to 
the defendant subject to reasonable rights of visitation in the 
plaintiff. 
3. Plaintiff shall provide such health insurance protection 
for Amanda as is available through his employment and each of the 
parties shall pay one-half (1/2) of any uninsured medical or dental 
expenses incurred on behalf of Amanda. 
4. The parties enjoyed a standard of living and affluence 
higher than that which they presently enjoy. However, based on 
their present income: 
a. The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant alimony in 
the sum of $500.00 per month, which shall terminate 
upon the remarriage or death of the defendant or 
further order of the court; 
b. Plaintiff shall pay to the defendant child support 
in the sum of $500. 00 per month until Amanda 
graduates from high school with her regularly 
scheduled graduating class and in addition thereto, 
the plaintiff shall pay for Amanda7 s tuition and 
registration fees to Judge Memorial High School 
until such time as Amanda shall graduate from that 
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school. Defendant shall pay for books, uniforms 
and additional school expenses for Amanda. 
5. The parties shall exchange information regarding their 
income on April 15 of each year commencing 1991, including the 
exchange of income tax returns and six (6) months thereafter, to 
wit: October 15, 1991, and each year thereafter, their present 
income earnings including year to date income payment stubs. In 
considering the income exchanged, they shall disclose perks, which 
are provided for their benefit such as use of a car, use of a 
company credit card, use of an expense account or such other 
similar items. 
6. The home acquired by the parties during their marriage on 
Skyline Drive, Lot 26, Quailbrook Subdivision, and the 1985 Blazer 
are awarded to the defendant and the plaintiff is ordered to 
execute all necessary documents to transmit all right, title and 
interest of those properties to the defendant who thereafter shall 
assume and pay any debts or obligations due and owing thereon and 
hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
7. All of the stock owned by the parties in Scotia Systems, 
Inc. , 340 shares and the stock owned by the parties in Scotia 
Engineering, 150 shares and awarded to the defendant and the 
plaintiff is ordered to sign all necessary documents to transfer 
the stock ownership of those securities to the defendant. 
8. Each of the parties is awarded their own personal 
property and personal effects. 
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9. It is entered in favor of the defendant and against the 
plaintiff in the sum of $6,000.00 for unpaid alimony previously 
awarded to the defendant and not paid by the plaintiff. 
10. In 1989, the plaintiff purchased an annuity for his 
retirement from Mass Mutual Insurance Company. The money 
accumulated in that policy has been utilized to try to keep it in 
effect and funds are presently due to keep it in full force and 
effect. It is in technical default. The plaintiff is attempting to 
maintain that and keep that as an asset. Plaintiff is ordered to 
keep the defendant advised as to his success in reinstating that 
insurance as an asset. 
11. The plaintiff filed a separate income tax return for the 
year 1989. Plaintiff shall file a joint tax return with the 
defendant for that year. If any additional tax or penalties are 
due, either to the Internal Revenue Service or the State of Utah, 
the plaintiff should not be required to pay the additional taxes or 
penalties. 
12. Each party shall take all actions necessary to implement 
and effect this decree of divorce. 
13. Each of the parties shall assume and pay their own 
attorney' s fees. w- y-
DATED this day of /(^^frfj&f^ , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
^Z 
HONORABLE RltlHAkO H. MOFFAT 
Third J u d i c i a ^ v D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
i\r\ncni 
APPROVED AS REFLECTING 
THE AGREEMENT OF THE 
PARTIES AND RULING OF THE 
COURT: 
MATTHEW F. McNULTY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
/cZX- * (^^UO-Ces^-C 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ J 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t ~^ 
(cdm\dsd\marysupp. dec) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a member of and/or employed with 
the law firm of COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. , 525 East First 
South, Suite 500, P.O.Box 11008, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008, 
and that in said capacity, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce and Judgment per 
Minute Entry of September 25, 1991, to be mailed to the person(s) 
named below: 
Frank 0' Donnell 
6935 South 825 East 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
on this ; day of October, 1991. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Frank P. O'Donnell, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : 
: CASE NO: 884902181 DA 
vs. : 
: JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
Mary A. O'Donnell, : 
Defendant. 
The Court having heard oral argument and taken testimony during the course of hearing 
on the plaintiffs Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree to reduce alimony and child support and 
now being fully advised in the premises makes this its: 
MINUTE ENTRY 
The Petition is denied. The Court is of the opinion that the provable facts regarding 
current income of the plaintiff are not substantially changed from the basis upon which the 
agreement between the parties as to child support and alimony was reached at the time of the 
original entry of the Divorce herein. Because the plaintiff is self employed or at least employed 
in a company in which he and his wife are major employees, stock holders and record keepers 
it is very difficult to establish precisely what each receives from said company. Nevertheless 
it is apparent to the Court that if the tests in Paffel and Rasband are applied there has not been 
such substantial change of material circumstance as to justify a modification at this time. 
O'DONNELL V. O'DONNELL PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
Counsel for the defendant will prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this _ _ ^ _ d a y of December, 1992. 
Richard H.Moffat 
District Court Judi 
'•fQOUKT 
n n r n n 
O'DONNELL V. O'DONNELL PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry, 
postage prepaid, to the following on this H day of December, 1992. 
Ellen Maycock 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Eighth Floor, Valley tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
David S. Dolowitz 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
7/yi.*n^ ^yj/yas^. 
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South 
Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOOOooo 
FRANK P. 0; DONNELL, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) Civil No. 884902181DA 
MARY A. O' DONNELL, ) Judge: Richard H. Moffat 
Defendant. ) 
oooOOOooo 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial 
on the Plaintiff s Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree and to 
Reduce Alimony and Child Support and the Defendant' s Request for 
Attorney' s Fees incurred in defending the Plaintiff s Petition. 
The Plaintiff was present in person represented by counsel, Ellen 
Maycock. The Defendant was present in person represented by 
counsel, David S. Dolowitz. The court heard and considered the 
testimony of each of the parties and reviewed the exhibits 
introduced by them, then determined to take the matter under 
advisement. Having considered the evidence presented, the 
arguments of counsel, and the governing law, the court issued its 
Minute Entry Ruling on the 4th day of December, 1992. Being thus 
APR - 1 1993 
advised in the premises, the court now makes and enters the 
following as its, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. At the time the parties were divorced, the court in 
paragraph 5 of its Amended Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law 
as entered on the 10th day of October, 1991, determined that the 
Plaintiff was employed throughout the marriage and has had the 
following history of earnings: 
Xaai: Company Amount 
1980 Kilborn, Ltd. $ 39,203 
1981 Kilborn, Ltd. $ 43,508 
1982 Kilborn, Ltd. $ 57,800 
1983 Kilborn, Ltd. $ 49,200 
1984 Kilborn, ltd. $ 57,694 
1985 Custom Equipment $ 80,912 
1986 Scotia Systems, Inc.$ 17,193 
1987 Scotia Systems, Inc.$133,391 
1988 Scotia, Inc. $115,653 
1989 Scotia, Inc. $161,000 
In 1990, Plaintiff had W-2 income of $48,000.00 and 
presently has income of $4,000.00 per month. The Defendant is 
presently employed as a legal assistant and earns a gross income of 
$1, 500. 00 per month. 
2. The Plaintiff testified that he is supposed to be 
paid $4,000.00 per month by his employer Scotia Engineering. 
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3. The Plaintiff is an officer and director of Scotia 
Engineering. He has remarried during since the entry of the Decree 
of Divorce in this marriage. His present wife keeps the books and 
records for Scotia Engineering. 
4. At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce in 
this matter, the Plaintiff was not being paid $4,000.00 per month, 
but believed he would be able to continue to make that kind of 
income from Scotia Engineering and in February of 1991 believed 
that he could continue to make $4,000.00 per month. 
5. The Plaintiff s present wife, Susan, has a base 
salary of $3,000.00 per month from Scotia Engineering. 
6. In addition to the Plaintiff7 s salary, he receives 
a car, medical insurance and an entertainment allowance which he 
uses for entertaining clients, but which also pays for his travel 
and entertainment. 
7. It is difficult from the records brought into court 
and the testimony of the Plaintiff and his wife, to determine 
precisely what is the Plaintiff s present income. The alimony and 
child support awards that were set on February 28, 1991, were set 
by agreement between the parties. The Plaintiff knowing that 
Scotia Engineering was having difficulty paying him, made the 
determination to set child support and alimony at the levels set by 
the court. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes 
and enters the following, 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In determining if there is a change of circumstances 
or determining whether or not the alimony paid by the Plaintiff to 
the Defendant should be adjusted, the court considers not only the 
income of the Plaintiff, but of his present spouse pursuant to the 
decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Paffel v. 
Paffel, 732 P. 2d 96 (Utah, 1986). 
2. In determining the income of the Plaintiff, the 
court considers not only the income which he has paid and for which 
he receives a W-2 form, but it also must consider the value of the 
perks and expenses that are paid for him, including travel and 
entertainment, Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P. 2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988). 
3. Because Plaintiff is self-employed, or at least 
employed in a company in which he and his wife are major employees, 
stockholders and record keepers, it is very difficult to establish 
precisely what each receives from that company. 
4. The burden of proof in establishing that a 
substantial change of material circumstances has occurred which 
requires the court to modify the Decree of Divorce, is upon 
Plaintiff, Bridenbauah v. Bridenbauah, 786 P. 2d 241 (Utah App. 
1990). The Plaintiff has failed to meet this test in light of the 
fact that he has not established clearly what he and his wife were 
paid by the company by which they are employed and of which they 
are controlling parties. Plaintiff has not established any 
material change in the earnings of the Defendant. The Plaintiff 
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acknowledges that his earnings were uncertain at the time that he 
entered into the Agreement in February, 1991 to pay alimony and 
child support in the amounts ordered by the court and taking all of 
these circumstances together, the Plaintiff has failed to establish 
the change in circumstances required for a modification of the 
Decree of Divorce that was entered in this matter based upon the 
Stipulation agreement of the parties. 
5. The Defendant has requested that she be awarded 
attorney' s fees for being required to defend this matter and that 
judgment be entered against the Plaintiff for the unpaid alimony 
and child support under the original Decree of Divorce. She should 
be directed to submit her Affidavit regarding the attorney' s fees 
so that the court can determine whether or not the Defendant is 
entitled to attorney' s fees and if so, in what amount based upon 
the economic circumstances of the parties pursuant to the evidence 
introduced by them at the Atrial in thiar matter. tie Atrial in tnisr ma-
DATED this / ^ a y of E&rfch, 1993. 
•ftlCHAto H/ MOEfFAT, 
District/Coufr£/ Judge 
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APPROVED AS TO 
THIS '- day Of 
March, 1993: 
i r ~4 
ELLEN MAZCOCK, Counsel 
for Plaintiff 
~L%**+d/& 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, Counse] 
for Defendant 
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South 
Fifth Floor 
P. O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOOOooo 
FRANK P. O' DONNELL, ) 
) O R D E R 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) Civil No. 884902181DA 
MARY A. O' DONNELL, ) Judge: Richard H. Moffat 
Defendant. ) 
oooOOOooo 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial 
on the Plaintiff s Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree and to 
Reduce Alimony and Child Support and the Defendant' s Request for 
Attorney' s Fees incurred in defending the Plaintiff s Petition. 
The Plaintiff was present in person represented by counsel, Ellen 
Maycock. The Defendant was present in person represented by 
counsel, David S. Dolowitz. The court heard and considered the 
testimony of each of the parties and reviewed the exhibits 
introduced by them, then determined to take the matter under 
advisement. Having considered the evidence presented, the 
arguments of counsel, and the governing law, the court issued its 
Minute Entry Ruling on the 4th day of December, 1992. Being thus 
APR - 1 1993 
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advised in the premises, and having entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that: 
1. The Petition of the Plaintiff to Modify the Decree 
of Divorce is denied. 
2. The Defendant shall submit her Affidavit regarding 
attorney' s fees and unpaid alimony and child support so that the 
court can determine whether or not the Defendant is entitled to 
attorney' s fees and if so, in what amount based upon the economic 
circumstances of the parties pursuant to the evidence introduce by 
them at the trial in this jtvatter 
DATED this ' day of 
District /Comrt/ Judge 
~r< ^ 
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APPROVED AS 10 
FORM AMB-^eOMTBflT 
THIS ^ '• day of 
March, 1993:
 ; 
ELLEN MAYCOCK, Counsel 
for Plaintiff 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, Counsel \ 
for Defendant < ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed this [ f day 
of March, 1993, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to 
the following individual: 
Ms. Ellen Maycock 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
(mb\dsd\0*Donnell. Order) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Frank O'Donnell, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiffs, : 
CASE NO: 884902181 DA 
vs. : 
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
Mary Agnes O'Donnell, 
Defendant. : 
The Court having considered the Objection to the Request for Attorney's Fees and having 
heard oral argument thereon and now being fully advised in the premises makes this its: 
MINUTE ENTRY 
The Court feels the question as to whether or not the defendant will obligated to pay 
attorney's fees by reason of the fact that she is employed by her attorney is not the proper 
inquiry in this case. Obviously she is entitled to be awarded her attorney's fees if under all the 
principles governing such matters she would normally be so entitled. The question of whether 
or not her attorney by and through the generosity of himself and his firm is willing to absorb 
the loss, if the defendant sustains one, should not be determinative as to whether or not the 
defendant is entitled to those fees under the general principles. The Court is of the opinion that 
in this case the defendant has demonstrated a need for some of her attorney's fees to be paid by 
the plaintiff and that the plaintiff by reason of the fact that both he and his wife are employed 
and are earning more money than the plaintiff regardless of what that amount might be and by 
the reason of the fact that the defendant has not been paid the amounts to which she is entitled 
ODONNELL V. ODONNELL PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
under the orders of the Court all mitigate toward the award of some attorney's fees to the 
defendant from the plaintiff. The Court is opinion that the plaintiff should pay $4,000.00 of the 
defendant's attorney's fees and costs. 
Counsel for the defendant will prepare an appropriate order. 
ODONNELL V. ODONNELL PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry, 
postage prepaid, to the following on this I ( day of May, 1993. 
Ellen Maycock 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
David S. Dolowitz 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Tab 7 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL ^uN j j ]g<y 
525 East First South 
Fifth Floor ' /'*) ^"E///^, 
P.O. Box 11008 / L^fljl^i 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 ' l—"' -/""'"VrT" 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooO 0 Oooo 
FRANK P. O'DONNELL, 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 884902181DA 
Judge: Richard H. Moffat 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARY A. O'DONNELL, 
Defendant. 
oooO 0 Oooo 
Having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree in the above-referenced matter 
rejecting the Plaintiff's Petition to Amend the Decree of Divorce 
and having therein in paragraph 5 reserved the issue of attorney's 
fees and having now had the opportunity to consider the Defendant's 
request for attorney's fees, the court has determined from the 
evidence presented that the Defendant is in need of assistance in 
the payment of her attorney's fees; that she incurred attorney's 
fees in the sum of $5,616.75; that the court has examined those 
attorney's fees and, finding that both the Plaintiff and his 
present wife are employed, and that Plaintiff has actual earnings 
and the obligation of support to him owed by his present wife while 
the Defendant has lesser earnings and no additional support coming 
to her, finds and concludes that the attorney's fees incurred by 
Defendant are reasonable, the Plaintiff has the ability to assist 
Defendant in payment of her attorney's fees and the Plaintiff 
should be ordered to pay to the Defendant attorney's fees in the 
sum of $4,000.00 and that judgment should be entered against him 
for that amount. 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant and against the 
Plaintiff for $4,000.00 as attorney's fees incurred in this matter 
and the Plaintiff is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff the $4,000.00 
in attorney's fees thus incurred. 
DATED this // day of 1993 
v// -& I 
COUR/T7/JUDGE '-''iZ-A*. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND 
CONTENT: 
/ / / 
c^  
ELLEN MAYCOCK, Counsel 
for Plaintiff 
7^//^ 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, Coun 
for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed this 2» ( day 
of May, 1993, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and 
Judgment to the following individual: 
Ms. Ellen Maycock 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
(mb\dsd\O'Donnell.Fees) 
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